2026 was a record year for ransomware. Attackers claimed 2,627 attacks in the third quarter alone, the highest quarterly total ever recorded (Comparitech). The year's worst attacks also showed how the threat has changed. Groups like ShinyHunters stole data and demanded payment without encrypting a single file (eSecurity Planet), while others hit shared platforms and cloud services that hundreds of organizations depend on.
This roundup ranks the five worst ransomware attacks of 2026 by financial exposure (ransoms demanded or paid, and any disclosed losses), then by the number of people and organizations affected, then by the disruption caused. Most victims have not disclosed what their attacks cost, and where that's the case, we say so. Our ranking is based on public reporting, company disclosures, and industry analysis.
The 5 worst ransomware attacks of 2026 at a glance
| Rank | Organization | Date | Group | Cost | Scale |
| 1. | McKesson | August 2026 | ShinyHunters | Not disclosed; $55.2M ransom demand, apparently unpaid | 284M records claimed; 6.4M people's emails leaked |
| 2. | Novo Nordisk | June 2026 | FulcrumSec, TheUSERS007 | Not disclosed; $25M and $50M demands refused | Drug IP and clinical trial data |
| 3. | Instructure (Canvas) | April–May 2026 | ShinyHunters | Not disclosed; ransom paid, amount not confirmed | About 8,800 institutions; 275M users claimed |
| 4. | IDC Frontier (IDCF Cloud) | October 2026 | Not named | Not disclosed | 495 companies and local governments |
| 5. | University of Mississippi Medical Center | February 2026 | Medusa (claimed) | $34.2M February revenue shortfall; $800K demand, not paid | All 35 clinics closed; 9-day shutdown |
1. McKesson (August 2026)
Group: ShinyHunters · Industry: Healthcare distribution · Data stolen: About 1 TB claimed (284 million records) · Cost: Not disclosed; $55.2 million ransom demanded
What happened: McKesson, one of the largest healthcare companies in the US, discovered the incident on August 25, 2026, and disclosed it in an SEC filing. ShinyHunters says it voice-phished several employees using a lookalike domain, took over their Okta single sign-on accounts, and used those sessions to pull data from McKesson's Salesforce and Snowflake environments between August 21 and 25. McKesson confirmed unauthorized access to third-party applications that led to data exfiltration, but hasn't confirmed how the attackers got in (Hexnode).
Impact: ShinyHunters demanded $55,236,150 with a 72-hour deadline (Hexnode). The demand appears to have gone unpaid, and the group published the data. It includes names, contact details, dates of birth, appointment notes, and personal health information tied to McKesson's oncology business. 6.4 million unique email addresses were leaked (eSecurity Planet). McKesson has not disclosed the cost of the attack.
Lesson: Identity is the new perimeter. No malware or encryption was needed: a convincing phone call and a stolen single sign-on session were enough to reach patient data at one of the country's biggest healthcare companies.
2. Novo Nordisk (June 2026)
Groups: FulcrumSec and TheUSERS007 · Industry: Pharmaceuticals · Data stolen: Clinical trial data and drug research · Cost: Not disclosed; $25 million and $50 million demanded
What happened: The Danish drugmaker behind Ozempic and Wegovy disclosed a security incident on June 11, 2026, affecting what it called "a limited number of internal IT systems." The cyber extortion group FulcrumSec claimed responsibility, said its intrusion lasted more than two months, and demanded $25 million. A second, lesser-known group, TheUSERS007, then claimed its own access and demanded $50 million (Fierce Pharma).
Impact: Novo refused to pay either group. FulcrumSec says the stolen data includes clinical trial participant information and intellectual property on obesity drugs amycretin and CagriSema, plus five undisclosed drug programs, and it began exploring private sales of the data after Novo refused. Novo said its main platforms kept operating and it saw no immediate risk to patients (Fierce Pharma). It has not disclosed the cost of the attack.
Lesson: Some losses cannot be restored. Backups restore systems and files, but they can't undo years of stolen drug research. Against data extortion, organizations need to detect intruders early, segment sensitive systems, and limit what any single foothold can reach.
3. Instructure / Canvas (April–May 2026)
Group: ShinyHunters · Industry: Education technology · Data stolen: 3.65 TB claimed, covering 275 million students, teachers and staff · Cost: Not disclosed; ransom paid, amount not confirmed
What happened: Attackers breached Canvas, the learning platform used by more than 41% of colleges and universities in North America, in late April 2026 (Reed Smith). Instructure said the attackers exploited an issue related to its Free-for-Teacher accounts. ShinyHunters claimed data on 275 million users across nearly 9,000 schools. After Instructure said the incident was contained, the group struck again on May 7, in the middle of final exams, putting a ransom demand on Canvas login pages and forcing Instructure to take the platform offline (KrebsOnSecurity).
Impact: Students lost access to course materials during finals, and some schools, including the University of Texas at San Antonio, postponed exams (OPB). Institutions in dozens of countries were affected (Reed Smith). On May 11, Instructure said it had reached an agreement with the attackers, who provided evidence that the data was destroyed. It did not disclose how much it paid (TechCrunch). The same day, House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Andrew Garbarino asked Instructure to brief the committee on the intrusions and its response (House Homeland Security Committee). At least two dozen federal lawsuits have since been filed, alleging negligence, breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment (GovTech). Instructure has not disclosed the cost of the attack.
Lesson: One platform can put an entire sector at risk. Thousands of schools that were never breached themselves lost access to the system their teaching depends on and had to trust a promise from criminals that their students' data was deleted.
4. IDC Frontier / IDCF Cloud (October 2026)
Group: Not publicly named · Industry: Cloud services · Data affected: Customer virtual servers, databases and snapshots in four zones · Cost: Not disclosed
What happened: At 3:40 a.m., local time on October 7, 2026, ransomware hit IDCF Cloud, the cloud service run by SoftBank subsidiary IDC Frontier, in its East Japan Region 1. The company shut down the affected systems, isolated them, and disabled management console access across all regions. A message from the attacker shown to customers claimed the breach took just seven minutes, and that 225 databases were encrypted, 239 hypervisors reached, 16,000 virtual machine disks sealed, and 554,153 snapshots wiped. IDC Frontier has not confirmed those figures (BleepingComputer).
Impact: The attack affected 495 companies and local governments. Virtual servers in four zones could not be restarted normally, and IDC Frontier warned that data there may be "difficult or impossible to retrieve." Recovery depended on backups customers had kept outside IDCF Cloud, and at least one prefecture reportedly could not access its own backup data after the outage (Tech Insider). IDC Frontier has not disclosed the cost of the attack.
Lesson: A cloud provider's snapshots are not your backups. When attackers reach the hypervisor layer, every snapshot stored alongside production can disappear with it. The customers best placed to recover were those with independent, immutable copies of their data outside the provider's environment.
5. University of Mississippi Medical Center (February 2026)
Group: Medusa (claimed) · Industry: Healthcare · Data stolen: Claimed by Medusa, not described · Cost: $34.2 million February revenue shortfall; $800,000 ransom demanded
What happened: In the early hours of February 19, 2026, ransomware hit the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC), which runs the state's only children's hospital, only Level I trauma center and only organ and bone marrow transplant program (BleepingComputer). UMMC took its network offline, including its Epic electronic health record system, and closed all 35 of its clinic locations statewide. Its hospitals and emergency departments stayed open, working on paper (HIPAA Journal; The Record). In March, the Medusa ransomware group claimed the attack, demanded $800,000 and threatened to leak data it said it had stolen. UMMC declined to comment on the ransom demand (The Record), and state officials later said no ransom was paid (Mississippi Today).
Impact: Systems were down for nine days, and clinics reopened on March 2, 2026 (The Record; TechTarget). About 650 delayed surgeries had to be rescheduled. UMMC's February operating revenue came in $34.2 million short of its $194.1 million budget, about 20%, and its net income fell $8.6 million behind budget for the year (Mississippi Today; DeSoto County News). UMMC has not disclosed the full cost of the attack.
Lesson: In healthcare, downtime is measured in cancelled care. How fast an organization can restore core systems like its health records from clean backups decides how soon patients can be treated normally again.
What these attacks reveal about ransomware in 2026
Extortion without encryption is now mainstream
Three of the five worst attacks of 2026 (McKesson, Novo Nordisk and Instructure) involved no encryption at all. Attackers simply stole data and threatened to publish or sell it. Across the industry, more than 641 TB of data was stolen in ransomware attacks in the third quarter of 2026 alone (Comparitech).
Stolen data gives attackers plenty of leverage: reputational damage, shaken investor confidence, regulatory penalties and lawsuits. Restoring systems doesn’t end this kind of threat, and paying the ransom doesn’t ensure that the stolen data will be deleted.
The real danger comes when exfiltration is paired with an attack on backups. If attackers both steal production data and compromise or steal the backups, victims are fighting on two fronts. They’re trying to contain a data leak while also being unable to recover and paying can start to look like the only option. Backups also hold complete copies of an organization’s most sensitive data, which makes them a valuable exfiltration target.
Taking away that leverage takes three layers working together:
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Contain the spread with Zero Trust. Least-privilege access, segmentation and continuous verification stop one compromised account from opening up the whole environment. That limits how much data attackers can reach and take.
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Encrypt production data locally. When sensitive data is encrypted at rest, with keys managed separately from the systems that hold it, stolen files are far less useful to publish or sell.
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Secure backups with Zero Trust Data Resilience (ZTDR) and encryption. Separating backup software from backup storage, using immutable storage and encrypting backup data keeps backups from becoming a second exfiltration target. It also means a clean recovery is always available.
Together, these layers keep attackers from winning on either front. Less data gets out, what does get out is worth less, and the business can recover without negotiating.
Shared platforms multiply the damage
Instructure and IDC Frontier each served thousands or hundreds of organizations (KrebsOnSecurity; BleepingComputer). A single breach at the platform became a crisis for every school, company, and local government that relied on it, including many that were never targeted directly. As more critical work moves onto shared cloud and SaaS platforms, one provider's bad day can become an entire sector's outage.
Recovery decides how bad an attack gets
Where attackers encrypted or destroyed systems, as at IDC Frontier and UMMC, the length and cost of the outage came down to one thing: whether clean, untouched backups were available to restore from. Omdia research commissioned by Object First found that only 39% of organizations recovered at least 75% of their data after a ransomware attack in 2026, down from 57% in 2024 (Omdia).
How to defend against attacks like these
Phishing-resistant MFA and help desk verification
The McKesson attack shows how far a phone call can go. Phishing-resistant MFA (such as hardware security keys), strict identity checks before help desks reset passwords or approve new devices, and monitoring for unusual single sign-on sessions all make it harder for attackers to turn one tricked employee into access to millions of records. Retiring unused accounts and credentials closes another door attackers routinely walk through.
Segmentation and early detection
When data is the target, the goal is to catch attackers before they leave with it. Segmenting sensitive systems, limiting what any single account can reach, and watching for large or unusual outbound transfers can shrink the blast radius of a breach. Decoys such as the Object First Honeypot can flag intruders early, while they're still exploring the network.
Absolute Immutability for reliable recovery
For attacks that encrypt or destroy, recovery depends on backups attackers can't touch. That means backups are absolutely immutable the moment they're written, so that no one, including privileged admins or an attacker with every password, can modify or delete them.
Only 16% of organizations say their backup storage meets that standard today, even though 93% say it's essential (Omdia).
Ready to become Simply Resilient? Request a demo
When—not if—ransomware strikes, your recovery depends on backup data that can't be altered or deleted under any circumstances. Object First Ootbi is secure, simple and powerful backup storage that's absolutely immutable and purpose-built for Veeam. With zero access to destructive actions, no one, not even a privileged admin or an attacker with every password, can change or erase your backups. So when chaos strikes, you can get back to business.
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